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This article represents a synthesis of the evaluation methods for cryptographic algorithms 
and of their efficiency within practical applications. It approaches also the main 
operations carried out in cryptanalysis and the main categories and methods of attack in 
order to clarify the differences between evaluation concept and crypto algorithm 
cracking.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Cryptology is the science of secrecy writings and its goal is the protection of data and 
information confidentiality with cryptosystems support. 
 
Cryptography is the defensive part of cryptology, its activity field being the design of 
cryptosystems and of used rules. People doing this job are called cryptographs.    
 
Cryptanalysis is the offensive part of cryptology, its activity field being the analysis of its 
own cryptosystems in order to get them the proper characteristics so they accomplish the 
functions intended  for. Cryptanalysis can also analyze cryptosystems of third parties 
through their cryptograms support. The specialists in this field are called cryptanalysts, or, 
using a more romantic word, codes crackers. 
 
Cryptographic algorithm  means a lot of reversible transformations through which the 
large amount of plain texts is transformed in the large amount M of cryptograms. 
 
The encryption key is a particular convention such as a word, phrase, number, numeric 
stream etc. that defines the encryption rule. 
 
Cryptographic protocol  is a set of rules, between two or more parties, permitting an 
authentication operation and/or a key or a message exchange. 
 
A cryptosystem  is composed by three elements: a cryptographic algorithm, a keys 
generation system and a protocol for keys distribution. 
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Over ciphering consists of a lot of transformations made on cryptograms and it has the 
role of strengthens the cryptograms resistance (and the strength of cryptosystem, too) 
against the attacks of third parties cryptanalysts. 
 
Deciphering is the opposite operation of enciphering and represents the application of the 
known ciphering system (in the presence of the right key) over cryptograms in order to 
discover the plain text.  
 
Decryption is the operation that allow, based on the analyses of cryptograms realized with 
an unknown cipher system, to reveal the plain text that has been encrypted and to 
determine the characteristics of the cryptosystem used for ciphering.   
 
Cryptosystems (ciphers, codes or a combination of them) are applied on plain texts edited 
in some language having structural and statistic characteristics according to that language. 
By applying cryptosystems, these characteristics are disturbed, the intensity and direction 
of these disturbances being found in cryptogram. A cryptosystem is better the more is the 
intensity of disturbances, so the cryptogram is not able anymore to reflect the structural 
characteristics of plain text. Different techniques and methods allow that some kind of 
systems to be invariant to some parameters. These invariants form the basic elements in 
cryptanalysis (see Tilborg [12] and Schneier [10] for an introduction in the cryptology 
field). 
 
We shall exemplify, in section 2 the main operations, which are done in cryptanalysis, the 
starting point being the design principles of cryptographic algorithms, evaluation criteria, 
operations that are performed in the cryptanalysis activity. Also we present the 
programming problem of cracking of a cipher like the dual of the programming problem 
of the evaluation. 
 
Section 3 presents a taxonomy of the main cryptanalytic attacks (attacks on encryption 
algorithm, attacks against the keys, attacks against authentication protocols and side 
channels attacks.  
 
2.  Operation in cryptanalysis 
 
2.1. Cryptanalytic principles  
 
Generally, designing a cryptosystem requires the meeting of the following design 
principles: 
1.  Don’t sub-estimate the adversary; 
2.  Only a cryptanalyst can assess the security of a cryptosystem; 
3.  For assessing a cryptosystem it has to be taking into account the fact that the 
adversary has complete knowledge about the evaluated system (Shannon [9]). 
The entire secret of a cryptosystem has to rely only on the secret key; 
4.  Superficial complications can be illusory and these can induce in 
cryptographist mind a feeling of false security; 
5.  All elements have to be taken into account, such as regulation regarding keys 
distribution.  
2.2. Evaluation criteria 
 
Claude Shannon has proposed the following elements to be taken into account when we 
analyze a cryptosystem: 
1.  The adversary’s gain from the possible material decryption; 
2.  The length of key and the complexity of key management; 
3.  The complexity of a cipher-decipher cycle; 
4.  The size of ciphered text related to the size of plain text; 
5.  The way of errors propagation. 
 
2.3. Four main operations of cryptanalysis 
 
Usually, the main operations for resolving any cryptogram are synthesized in the 
following steps: 
1.  Establishing the language used in the plain text; 
2.  Establishing the type of the cryptosystem used; 
3.  Reconstruction of a specific key (partial or incomplete) of the equivalent 
cryptosystem established at step 2; 
4.  Reconstruction of using such a system and/or establishing complete plain 
text.   
  In some cases, step 2 can precede step 1. This is the traditional approach in 
cryptanalysis and can be summarized: 
1.  Data arranging or rearranging in order to find non-random characteristics or 
manifestations (frequency numbering, redundancy, forms, symmetric 
phenomena etc.); 
2.  Recognize non-random characteristics or manifestations when they are stand 
out in relief (through statistics or other techniques); 
3.  Explain the non-random characteristics or manifestations when they are 
recognized (by chance, brightness or perseverance). The hardest work is to 
establish the general structure of the system. 
 
In the final analyses, the solution of every cryptogram involves a type of substitution that 
depend on reducing mono-alphabetic terms if the ciphered text is not expressed by plain 
text letters.  
 
2.4. Evaluation and cracking  
 
Evaluation is a process intended for highlight some unconformities or deficiencies of a 
cryptosystem which can be used by a cracker. 
 
The evaluation of a cryptographic module can by done using NIST FIPS 140-2 standard 
(structured on fourth levels) and the evaluation of a product can be done using Common 
Criteria (ISO 15408), methodology adopted by USA, Canada and EU (structured on 
seventh levels).  
 
Cracking represents an operation helping to design a technique, method or algorithm that 
permit the recovery of the system key or of the plain text having a reduced complexity 
than brute force attack method: 
- the evaluator wants to find the minimum quantity of output information that help him to 
determine, using some strong mathematical tools, a series of information about the cipher 
algorithm, used key and/or plain text; 
- the cracker wants to find the maximum quantity of information that help him to deduce 
the plain text. 
 
The terms minimum and maximum have a general meaning. In fact, there is a problem 
about multicriteria  decision (see Preda [7] for an introduction into Statistics Decision 
Theory): a series of objective functions have to be maximized (the size of ciphering key, 
the grade of nonlinearity, the complexity of equivalent linear, the period of pseudorandom 
generator, the risk of key interception in a crypto network etc.), and other function have to 
be minimized (key generator redundancy, the grade of correlation of inputs/outputs). 
These functions are related to the cryptosystem (the adversary has complete knowledge 
about the cryptosystem used), so the strengths of a ciphering system have to rely only on 
the secrecy of the key.   
 
We take a note Infon(m,c,k) for the additional information regarding the cryptosystem, so 
a vector relation between a collection of n plain texts, a collection of p(n) cryptograms 
and a collection of q(n) particular keys. The relation Infon(m,c,k) is built with the support 
of more types of attacks, such as: attack based on plain text (known plain text and/or 
chosen plain text), differential attack, knowing a collection of particular keys (q(n)>0), 
identical texts ciphered with two or more different keys (to a plain text correspond more 
ciphered texts). 
 
For evaluator. Let us consider en∈[0;1] a sequence of real numbers and objective 
function n-p(n)-q(n).   
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where H(m|c)  is conditioned  entropy (see Guiaşu [4] for the  definition  of conditional 
entropy) of the vector of m plain texts by the vector of cryptograms c. 
 
The evaluator wants that: 
1.  1 limn = ∞ → n e  (knowing ciphered text doesn’t compromise plain text); 
2. to minimize the maximum loss (noted here by L(x, y)), thus: 
( ), , max min y x L y x = α  
where  x  is the defense strategy of the evaluator (called defense policy too), and y is 
attacker strategy. 
 For cracker.  Let us consider  [ ] 1 ; 0 ∈ n d  a sequence of real numbers and objective function 
n+p(n)+q(n). 
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where H(m|c) is conditioned entropy of the plain texts by the vector of cryptograms c. 
 
The cracker wants that: 
1.  0 limn = ∞ → n d  (knowing ciphered text doesn’t compromise plain text); 
2. to maximize the minimum gain (noted here by L(x, y), the gain being a negative loss), 
thus:  
( ), , min max y x L x y = β  
where x and y have the same specifications. 
 
In general we have β≤ α, the maximum of minimum gain of the cracker can’t oversize the 
minimum of maximum loss of the evaluator (if we have equality it means the 
appropriated strategies are called saddle points for L function. 
We have β < α,  if interception channel is with perturbation. 
The two programming problems (evaluator/cracker) are dual problems.  
We have the following vector relation: 
c= f(m;kt), 
where f  is the ciphering operator. 
 
If kt=k for every t∈T (T is the ciphering period which is a discreet collection) then the 
above relation is rewritten: 
c=f(m;k), where f  is the enciphering operator. In this case we say there is about a 
codification of the information (the role of codes theory is to protect information against 
error that can appear on the communication channel; the role of the cryptography is to 
protect the information against unauthorized interception).  
 
In case of codification after resolving an nonlinear system, we can write: 
 
m=h(c;k).                        (3) 
 
So knowing f allow us to determine m from c. System (1), which is a stochastic system is 
more difficult to resolve then system (2), which is a determinist system, because it doesn’t 
have the t parameter. The solution of system (2), given by (3), is a particular solution of 
system (1) for the case kt being equal to k. In another words, we can say that encoding 
operation is an operation of ciphering with a particular key.  
 
Many times, the function of ciphering f is given is scalar form: 
ci=f(mi,ki), for every i=1,…,n, 
where ki is the key obtained from secret key kt. 
If f can be factorized like this:  
 
), ( ⊕ = i k g i i i m     ) k   , f(m where ⊕ is summing operator mod 2, than the encryption scheme 
is called stream ciphering and function g pseudorandom number generator. Because of 
the simplicity (from the point of view of implementation) this scheme is used in ciphering 
data and voice communications. In this case, the difficulty of cracking is equivalent with 
the difficulty of prediction or even of determination of g  function. The technique of 
solving the problem is equivalent with the technique of reverse engineering.  
 
If we want to design a good cipher we have to guarantee a minimum complexity of 
cracking of O(2
n) (this means the opponent can’t crack the system in polynomial time or, 
with another words, the more efficient cracking method is exhaustive searching  for key 
or password), and if we want to design a cracker procedure  for a ciphering algorithm then 
we have to guarantee a complexity of at least O(n) (this means that we crack the adversary 
system in a time no more then polynomial). 
 
The evaluation of the cryptosystems complexity is part of confirmation tests. These tests 
are made, usually, after reference test processing (statistical tests or other functional 
criteria: strict avalanche, balance, no linearity, symmetry, no degeneration, no correlation. 
Tests for ciphering system evaluation are made in this order: 
  STEP 1. Performs references tests: statistical tests (see  NIST Special Publication 
800-22 [14] for a statistical test suite). If the ciphering system fall these tests (multicriteria 
decision) than it reject this cipher system, and, in opposite case, it performs STEP 2. 
These tests are processed in O(1) time with O(1) memory cost and they have a sensitivity 
usually bigger than 95%. 
  STEP 2. Performs references tests: functional tests  (see Simion [8] for the 
definition of functional tests). If the ciphering system fall these tests (multicriteria 
decision) than it reject this cipher system, and, in opposite case, it performs STEP 3. 
These tests are processed in O(n) time, O(1) memory cost and they have a sensitivity 
usually bigger than 98%. 
   STEP 3. Performs confirmation tests: linear complexity tests. If the ciphering 
system fall these tests (multicriteria decision) than it reject this cipher system, and, in 
opposite case, it performs STEP 4. These tests are processed in O(n) time with  O(n) 
memory cost and they have a sensitivity usually bigger than 99%. 
  STEP 4. Performs confirmation tests: Lempel-Ziv tests and squared complexity 
tests. If the ciphering system fall these tests (multicriteria decision) than this cipher 
system has a hidden predictability, and, in opposite case, it pass the tests suite. These tests 
are processed in O(2
n) time with  O(2
n) memory cost and they have a sensitivity usually 
bigger than 99.9%. 
  It is obvious the faster tests are those from steps 1 and 2 and the slowest tests are 
from step 4.  
 
3.  Classifications of cryptanalytic attacks 
 
This paragraph presents a series of attacks against cipher systems. There are attacks 
against cipher algorithms, keys, authentication protocols, system itself and 
unconventionally attacks (side channel attacks). These types of attacks are not exhaustive, 
an efficient attack being composed, usually, from a sub-collection of the followings: 
 3.1 Types of attacks against cipher algorithms 
 
The main types of attacks related to the cipher algorithms are the following: 
 
Attack with known plain text. The cryptanalyst got a ciphered text and its correspondent in 
plain. By this mean, the cryptanalyst intend to separate the text information from the 
cipher key, having the possibility to obtain, by specific methods, the cipher algorithm or a 
part of it and/or the key. 
 
Attack with chosen plain text. The cryptanalyst can indicate the plain text that is to be 
encrypted. By this mean, the cryptanalyst intend to separate the text information from the 
cipher key, having the possibility to obtain, by specific methods, the cipher algorithm 
and/or the key. 
 
Attack with ciphered-ciphered text. The cryptanalyst got a plain text and its correspondent 
text encrypted with two or more different keys. By specific methods, the cryptanalyst can 
restore the cipher algorithm or a part of it. 
 
Divide and conquer attack. The cryptanalyst can realize a series of correlations between 
different incomings (inputs) in algorithm and its outgoing (output), trying to separate 
different incomings (inputs) in algorithm, this helping him to divide the problem in two 
ore more problems easier to resolve.  
 
Linear syndrome attack. This method consist in the elaboration of a linear equations 
system of pseudorandom generator and the verification of these by the ciphered text, 
obtaining the plain text with a high probability. 
 
Linear consistency attack. This method consist in the elaboration of a linear equations 
system of pseudorandom generator starting from an equivalent cipher key and the 
verification of the system by the pseudorandom generator with a probability close to 1, 
obtaining the plain text with a great probability. 
 
Stochastic  attack  against generator outgoing (output), also called attack by prevision 
(forecast), is possible if the outgoing of the generator is correlated, the cryptanalyst 
succeeding to get, as input data, the output of pseudorandom generator and ciphered text, 
obtaining in this way the appropriate plain text. In order to avoid this type of attack, the 
generator must meet the following requirements: 
•  balance: all possible inputs have to produce all possible outputs for the 
same number of times; 
•  non-degeneration: output depends of all the elements of the input; 
•  immunity at correlation: correlated inputs generate uncorrelated outputs; 
•  strict avalanche: the change of a bit at input has to produce changes of 
50% at output.  
 
Linear informational attack  against generator, also called linear complexity attack,  is 
possible if the generator can be amounted to an algorithm type Fibonacci, and if the  
 
equivalent linear complexity of the generator is small. With this techniques support it is 
possible to build an equivalent algorithm and an equivalent cipher key. 
 
Attack with the period of the pseudorandom generator support is possible if the period of 
the pseudorandom generator is small and can rebuild the appropriate plain text.   
 
Attack with IT viruses support is possible if the cipher algorithm is implemented and run 
on vulnerable or unprotected PC. The virus can substitute or inhibit the cipher algorithm 
being used.         
 
3.2 Types of attacks against keys 
 
These are the most often attacks against cipher keys: 
 
The brute force attack consists in exhaustive checking of keys or passwords and it is 
possible if: 
  - the length of key or passwords is short; 
  - the space of key or passwords is small. 
  The smart brute force attack can be realized if the degree of key or password 
randomness is small (small entropy) and allow finding passwords similar with words from 
the language being used.  
 
The backtracking attack  consists in implementation of the method of looking type 
backtracking (that assume the existence of conditions for continue searching in the proper 
direction, see Knuth [6]). 
 
The greedy attack provides optimum local key, which can be, or not the same as global 
optimum key.  
 
The dictionary attack (searching passwords or keys is done using a dictionary) is possible 
if password or key are words having sense (names, data etc.) 
 
The hybrid dictionary attack is possible by modifying words from dictionary, initializing 
the brut attack with dictionary’s words support.  
   
The attack with IT viruses support is possible if the keys are stored on an unprotected PC.  
 
The attack against the hash of the password/key  is possible if hash is short or 
inappropriate elaborated.  
 
The substitution attack is performed when a third person substitute the original key and 
replaced in entire network (or a part of it). It is possible with IT viruses’ support. 
 
Storing the cipher key in an inappropriate way (together with encrypted data), in plain, 
without measures of physical or cryptographic protection (software or hardware), can lead 
to an attack against encrypted message.   
 Improper storing of old keys can lead to compromise old encrypted documents.  
 
Key compromise. If the asymmetric key is compromised, only those document encrypted 
with this key are compromised too. If the public key is compromised, and the key may be 
stored on different servers, the attacker can substitute the real user causing damages in the 
entire communications network. Thus, the existence of master keys or of backup keys 
represents breaches in cryptosystem.  
 
Conclusions: the existence of a system for key generation and management is a sine qua 
non condition  in order to minimize the probability of a succeeded attack against 
cryptographic keys.  
 
3.3 Types of attacks against authentication protocols 
 
The authentication protocols are the subject to the following types of attacks: 
 
Cryptographic attack against the public key used for signature within protocol (if the 
public key infrastructure is used). 
Cryptographic attack against symmetric algorithm  used for signature within an 
authentication protocol (is the symmetric system is used). 
In order to avoid the attack against digital signatures the signature must be accomplish 
the followings requirements: 
•  the signature can not be tampered: the signature is a proof that the issuer 
has signed deliberately the document; 
•  the signature is authentic: the signature persuade the recipient that the 
issuer has signed deliberately the document; 
•  the signature is not reusable: the signature is part of the document and it 
can’t be moved on another document; 
•  the signed document can be altered: after the signature process, the 
document can’t be changed without detection; 
•  the signature is non-repudiated: the issuer can’t pretend  later that he 
hasn’t sign the respective document. 
 
There are some types of special digital signature like: the invisible signature that can be 
read only by the recipient of the document and the fail-stop signature  that is a 
cryptographic protocol when the issuer can bring proofs if his signature has been changed. 
Birthday attack, is possible if there is a high probability that signature applied on two 
different documents to produce the same signature.  
Passive attack against authentication protocol. The interceptor monitors the 
communication on channel without doing any intervention, his goal being to produce 
conclusions about the authentication process.  
Attack through a third person. The communication between the two partners of the 
communication channel is active intercepted by a third party. 
 
3.4 Types of attacks against the system 
  
 
The cipher system (algorithm, key and authentication protocol) can be the target to the 
following types of attacks: 
  Attack at algorithm level. These types are mentioned above. 
  Improper use of cipher algorithm: 
•  there is no message key algorithm; 
•  improper use of over encryption can lead to an equivalent algorithm 
which is weaker than every individual algorithm. 
  Attack at key level.  These types are mentioned above. 
  Attack on authentication protocol or on key distribution protocols. 
  Attacks generated by implementation errors. 
 
3.5 Hardware attacks against cryptographic modules 
 
The following methods of attacks require a series of hardware measurements on crypto 
module: 
Timing attacks. By measuring the time required to do some operations against private key, 
the attacker can determine the exponents used in Diffie - Hellman protocol, RSA factor, 
as well as a series of other crypto systems such as digital signature algorithm – DSS (see 
Kocher [5]). 
Simple power analysis. The attack with the support of simple power analyses (SPA) 
consist in measuring the power consumed by device during crypto operation. This kind of 
attack is applied, usually, to devices with extern source of voltage (as smart-cards). The 
power demand depends on the instruction executed. Thus, by monitoring the power 
demand, we can deduce the sequence of instructions (the source code). If the sequence of 
instructions depends on the key length, than the power demand can give information 
about the key. In most processors, the pattern of the power demand by an instruction 
depends on the operators values (as an example, setting a bit into a registry require more 
power then deleting it). Measurements on more incomings can deduce the operator value. 
This technique is called Differential Power Analysis (DPA). 
Attacks with hardware errors support. Hardware equipments can generate errors 
(transient, latent or induced) during arithmetic operations. By rationale exploitations of 
these errors it is possible to recover the private key for RSA and Rabin signature 
algorithms. Other cryptographic protocols such as Fiat - Schamir and Schnorr can be 
broken using the results of these errors (see Boneh [3]). 
 
Differential fault analysis. Differential fault analysis (DFA) is a scheme used to recover 
the secret keys of a crypto system from a physical protected HSM device (Hardware 
Security Module). The model (see Biham and Shamir [2]) is that of random failure or 
induced failure. This method helps for keys identification in case of using known ciphers 




This article approaches a status quo  of analytical results regarding the typology and 
categorization of all types of attacks met in nowadays cryptology. It has to be taken into 
account that behind every class and type of attacks there are standards, mostly IT and 
INFOSEC (CRYPTO), and also strong mathematical and technological supports. On the other hand, from the crypto experts’ point of view, it has to be stated that the above 
categorization is not so incomprehensible, so the success in cryptanalysis requires many 
times complex attacks of more types and the existence of additionally information worth 
more than a standardized attack. Comparative analysis of these types of attacks would be 
very useful, stating that even this research doesn’t get theoretical news in the field this 
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